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1011 
Arbitration Awards in an Environment of Compulsory 
Unionization: Is the High Degree of Deference 
Warranted? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advocates of compulsory unionization have long maintained that 
conditioning continued employment upon union membership is not 
discriminatory so long as anyone may join the union; a closed shop is 
justified so long as there is an open union.1 The idea, stripped down 
to its essentials, is that unions must play fair; whatever obligation 
there is at the outset for unions to practice non-discriminatory 
admission practices,2 that obligation grows when unions hold the 
keys to the workshop.3 
Since unions often hold the keys to the courtroom as well,4 they 
must play fairly when pressing employee grievances. For example, it 
is well-settled that a union that fails to press black union members’ 
allegations of discrimination runs afoul of both Title VII and § 
1981;5 once the union is exclusively entrusted with filing claims for 
its members, it must exercise that power fairly.6 Under compulsory 
 
 1. E.g., FRANK T. STOCKTON, THE CLOSED SHOP IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 176 
(1911); see also JOHN MITCHELL, ORGANIZED LABOR: ITS PROBLEMS, PURPOSES, AND 
IDEALS AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN WAGE EARNERS 283 (1903). 
 2. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2006). 
 3. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 283. 
 4. Often, but not always, whether and in what circumstances an employee may still file 
a claim with the EEOC after already having arbitrated a claim of discrimination is a well-
researched topic beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally EEOC v. Waffle House, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). It is sufficient to note here that in certain circumstances, an 
employee’s claim is barred by res judicata because of the union’s previous litigation or 
arbitration of that claim. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 
(1991); cf. Jacobs v. CBS Broad., Inc., 291 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to 
give res judicata effect to a union decision because of the union’s lack of procedural formalities, 
but reaffirming that union arbitration decisions, properly conducted, do merit res judicata 
effect from the judiciary). 
 5. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987). While the holding in 
Goodman has been superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), and Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons 
Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371, 383–84 (2004), the factual circumstances of Goodman continue to 
show that a union’s interests may diverge from an individual worker’s interests. 
 6. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 669. 
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unionism, however, the union holds the courthouse keys for both 
the willingly and unwillingly unionized.7 
The judiciary, while occasionally distinguishing between the 
levels of deference given to union-controlled and individual-
controlled grievance procedures,8 has never used similar rationale to 
distinguish between the subsets of union-controlled grievance 
procedures—namely, closed9 and open shops. 
The distinction drawn in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.10 
between individual- and union-entered arbitration agreements 
provides a workable rationale that could be extended to warrant 
different treatment of closed- and open-shop arbitration awards. A 
union’s previous arbitration of an employee’s racial discrimination 
claim did not stop the employee from subsequently litigating on his 
own behalf, because, inter alia, “[i]n arbitration, as in the collective-
bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be 
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the 
bargaining unit,” and “harmony of interest between the union and 
the individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where 
a claim of racial discrimination is made.”11 The same rationale should 
be applied in the context of arbitration awards—in particular, that in 
at least some cases of individual arbitration awards agreed upon 
through unionized arbitration, “the interests of the individual 
employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all 
employees in the bargaining unit,” and, further, that “harmony of 
interest between the union and the individual employee cannot 
always be presumed.”12 
Thus, because of the increased likelihood of divergent interests 
between the individual worker and the union in a closed-shop 
 
 7. For a review of the statutory law governing closed shops, see infra Part III.A. 
 8. “Occasionally,” because the enforcement of arbitration agreements has 
contemplated whether the individual or the union entered into the agreement, but the 
enforcement of arbitration awards has not. See infra Part II. 
 9. This Comment uses the expression “closed shop” interchangeably with “compulsory 
unionism.” For a discussion of whether “closed shop” is a misnomer, see infra Part III.A. 
 10. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Gardner-Denver holding has been narrowed significantly 
by subsequent decisions and may even “be a strong candidate for overruling” if it is inseparable 
from its broader interpretation. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 
(2009). Here, Gardner-Denver’s significance derives more from its position as the historical 
high watermark of distrust in arbitration than from its (limited) continued vitality. 
 11. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19. 
 12. Id. 
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setting, arbitration awards rendered in a closed shop ought to be 
viewed with a higher level of scrutiny than they currently receive.13 
Specifically, courts ought to view closed-shop labor arbitration 
awards with a “manifest disregard of the law” standard of review that 
involves actually verifying that an arbitrator has correctly applied the 
law. 
In making that argument, this Comment traces the evolutionary 
split in case law governing union-based arbitration agreements and 
union-based arbitration awards. Under current law, a union may 
only agree to mandatory arbitration on behalf of its members when 
the waiver of the right to litigate in the collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) is clear and unmistakable. In notable contrast, 
once a labor arbitrator has rendered an award, a judge views the 
completed award with substantial deference that involves an extreme 
unwillingness to overturn labor arbitrators’ decisions. By claiming 
that closed-shop labor arbitration decisions ought to be viewed 
under a strict “manifest disregard of the law” standard of review, this 
Comment argues that at least a subset of arbitration decisions should 
follow the path of arbitration agreements.14 
Part II of this Comment explores the divergence between the 
judiciary’s unwillingness to enforce labor arbitration agreements and 
its willingness to enforce completed labor arbitration awards. Part III 
explains how compulsory unionization vitiates the reasons for 
awarding labor arbitration awards a high degree of deference. Part 
IV gives a modest suggestion for a standard of review of arbitration 
awards that would be more appropriate in the context of compulsory 
unionization. Part V concludes by noting that using a strict level of 
scrutiny to review such arbitration awards is, ironically, a faithful 
extension of the Supreme Court’s initial reasoning that gave 
substantial deference to labor arbitration awards. 
 
 13. But this Comment does not argue that arbitration decisions made in an open shop 
should necessarily receive the same amount of scrutiny they currently receive. This Comment 
focuses on closed shops because they are more demonstrably illustrative of the possibility of a 
divergence of interests between individual worker and union, but such a divergence may also 
be found in an open shop with further research. Therefore, this Comment’s thesis could be 
restated: closed-shop arbitration awards merit a higher degree of scrutiny than they currently 
receive, and perhaps open-shop arbitration awards do as well. I disclaim any intention of 
showing that there is a bright line between closed and open shops that merits higher scrutiny 
for the former and the status quo for the latter. 
 14. Part II.A, infra, shows that judicial review of arbitration agreements is more 
protective of the unionized worker than the non-unionized worker. 
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II. DIVERGENT TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS 
That the judiciary has come to treat arbitration awards and 
arbitration agreements differently is important not only as a basic 
contextual background, but also to show that at least a subset of 
arbitration awards—those rendered within a closed shop—should 
follow the pattern of arbitration agreements. 
As a preliminary introduction to a discussion of specific cases, it 
will help to clarify the distinction between the enforcement of an 
arbitration award and the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate 
in the first place. For purposes of this Comment, a court enforces an 
arbitration award15 when, after the parties have gone through the 
entire arbitration process, the court refuses to alter the decision made 
by the arbitrator. In contrast, a court enforces an arbitration 
agreement when, before the parties ever go to arbitration, one of the 
parties claims that it should not have to arbitrate its claim at all, and 
the court compels that party to submit to arbitration. Although this 
Comment ultimately speaks to the level of scrutiny with which courts 
ought to view awards, the history of enforcing agreements is relevant: 
this Part describes how some factors that have classically applied to 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement would logically apply 
to the enforcement of an arbitration award. 
A. The Development of the “Clear and Unmistakable Waiver of 
Rights” Standard for Arbitration Agreements 
With the above distinction in mind, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
demonstrates an evolving tension between the “longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements”16 and federal pro-arbitration 
laws—namely, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)17 and the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA).18 The FAA makes most19 
 
 15. “Award” in this Comment, for purposes of simplicity, encompasses any arbitral 
decision, whether representing monetary damages or injunctive relief. 
 16. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
 17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). 
 19. This Comment does not reach the FAA’s statutory construction debate, exemplified 
by the majority and dissent in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
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arbitration agreements enforceable,20 but generally does not apply to 
organized labor,21 while the LMRA does. The culmination of the 
following history of enforcing arbitration agreements is a two-tiered 
system of treatment: a CBA must contain a clear and unmistakable 
waiver of the right to litigate a claim in order for the arbitration 
agreement to be enforceable; for non-union workers, there is no 
such requirement. 
1. Hostility gives way to pro-arbitration laws 
Predating American independence, English courts regarded 
arbitration agreements as an automatically suspect encroachment 
into their domain.22 American courts were still demonstrating a 
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements when Congress, in 
 
 20. See Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements 10 Years after Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 249, 250–56 (2006). 
 21. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Eighty-Fourth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar 
Lecture: The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 253 (2008). 
Courts have not applied the FAA to labor arbitration because of the Act’s exclusion of 
“contracts of employment” in § 1. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor 
Coach Employees of Am. v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951); 
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (4th Cir. 
1993). However, the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, has held that the 
“contracts of employment” exclusion applies “only [to] contracts of employment of 
transportation workers.” 532 U.S. at 119. The extent of the FAA’s input in organized labor 
arbitration (for unions not dealing in the actual transportation of goods) is therefore an open 
question. Still, labor arbitration is most squarely governed by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.S. 
§ 185. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449–52 (1957); 
Carbonneau, supra, at 253. 
In any case, it is clear that cases decided under the FAA have influenced later cases 
decided under the LMRA, and vice versa. Compare John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 
U.S. 543, 544 (1964) (resolving a claim brought under the LMRA), with Necchi S.P.A. v. 
Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1965) (referencing John 
Wiley & Sons as a source of arbitration-agreement enforcement policy to resolve a claim 
brought under the FAA). See also Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 
(3d Cir. 1969) (making a decision under the LMRA while explicitly analogizing to the FAA). 
Since demarcating the boundary between the LMRA and FAA is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, it will be sufficient to note that both statutes have influenced the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements and awards. Beyond that, the question of the exact boundary line 
between the two acts will have to remain unresolved and in a footnote, as in Wright v. 
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 n.1 (1998). 
 22. See Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746); see also Tobey v. County of 
Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (reviewing English cases refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements). 
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response to a lobby of business and industry leaders,23 passed the 
United States Arbitration Act in 1925.24 In the pre-Erie 
jurisprudence of that time, the original goal of the FAA was to 
provide federal courts sitting in a diversity action with some basis for 
not overruling state laws that were already in place to enforce 
arbitration agreements.25 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Erie would ostensibly have eliminated the need for the FAA, the Act 
took on a life and reason of its own: in 1947 the FAA was re-
adopted as positive law,26 and became “no longer a mere gap-filler, 
but . . . the repository of a nascent federal policy.”27 
In the same year that the FAA was re-adopted, Congress passed 
the LMRA in response to President Truman’s request for 
“legislation . . . to provide adequate means for settling industrial 
disputes and avoiding industrial strife . . . in important, nationwide 
industries.”28 Also known as the Taft-Hartley Act,29 the LMRA was 
actually a group of amendments to the National Labor Relations 
Act.30 Along with specific measures to limit the power of unions to 
 
 23. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 245. 
 24. The United States Arbitration Act lost its naming section in 1947 and subsequently 
became known as the Federal Arbitration Act. Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some 
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 580 n.1 (1952); Gavin, supra note 20, at 252. 
 25. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 245–46. For a different view, see Michael H. LeRoy 
& Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale 
Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 175 (2008) (“Congress was determined to make 
arbitration agreements enforceable everywhere but realized that federal jurisdiction was quite 
limited in the 1920s.”). 
 26. Sturges & Murphy, supra note 24, at 580 n.1; Note, Enforceability Under the 
United States Arbitration Act: Collective Bargaining Agreements and Contracts Not “Involving 
Commerce,” 63 YALE L.J. 729, 729 n.1 (1954). 
 27. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 249. 
 28. Steven E. Abraham, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Balance of Power in 
Industrial Relations, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 341, 348 (1996) (citing FRED A. HARTLEY, OUR NEW 
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY: THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND THE NEXT STEPS 74–75 (1948)). 
President Truman eventually vetoed the bill, and the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over his veto. 
Id. at 350–51. 
 29. Id. at 343 n.8. 
 30. Deborah A. Ballam, The Law as a Constitutive Force for Change, Part II: The Impact 
of the National Labor Relations Act on the U.S. Labor Movement, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 452 
(1995). 
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disrupt industry,31 the LMRA seeks “to provide additional facilities 
for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce.”32  
2. Deference in practice: The Steelworkers Trilogy 
      In 1960, the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers Trilogy. 
The Steelworkers Trilogy is significant to this discussion because 
arbitration agreements in a CBA (such as that negotiated between 
the United Steelworkers Union and its employers) won enforcement 
from the Supreme Court much earlier than those in individual 
contract disputes.33 Specifically, United Steelworkers of America v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.34 (Steelworkers I) began to reverse 
the general lack of deference given to arbitration agreements.35 
In that case, workers of a steel production company alleged that 
the company had laid employees off for lack of work, and then 
contracted with independent contractors, some of whom were the 
laid-off workers, at a lower wage to do the same work.36 The 
arbitration agreement stated that if there was any question about the 
scope of the employment contract, the matter was to be resolved by 
arbitration.37 The Supreme Court found that management’s decision 
to dismiss employees and then contract with private workers was 
within the purview of the arbitration agreement and, therefore, 
precluded litigation in court.38 
That same year, the Court continued the trend in United 
Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.39 
 
 31. For a discussion of these, see generally Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley 
Act Hindered Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1994). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 80-101 (1947). The original full title of the public law constituting the 
LMRA was “AN ACT To amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide additional 
facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize legal 
responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other purposes.” Id. 
 33. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 34. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (Steelworkers I), 
363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
 35. Michael P. Wolf, Give ‘Em Their Day in Court: The Argument Against Collective 
Agreements Mandating Arbitration to Resolve Employee Statutory Claims, 56 J. MO. B. 263, 
264 (2000). 
 36. Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. at 576. 
 37. Id. at 575–76. 
 38. Id. at 583–85. 
 39. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co. (Steelworkers II), 363 U.S. 564 
(1960). 
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(Steelworkers II), by ruling that “courts cannot review the merits of 
an arbitration award under the guise of examining arbitrability.”40 In 
that case, United Steelworkers sought to compel arbitration of a 
wage dispute that the employer had refused to submit to arbitration 
and which the appellate court termed “frivolous” and “patently 
baseless.”41 The Supreme Court found that it was not the province 
of the courts to pass on the merits of something specifically 
delegated to an arbitral board.42 In other words, since the matter of 
whether or not there was any merit to wage disputes was supposed 
to be arbitrated in the first place, the courts could not refuse to 
compel arbitration, even though the lower courts had determined 
that the claims were frivolous.43 
3. The judiciary formally recognizes tension between union and worker 
Despite the trends to recognize and enforce arbitration 
agreements, the Court expressed apprehension that such agreements 
could compromise individual interests. In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,44 the Supreme Court addressed the topic of union-
versus-non-union enforcement of arbitration agreements in a 
footnote with broad implications.45 There, the Court  
voiced concern about “the union’s exclusive control over the 
manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented” 
as well as concern that “[i]n arbitration, as in the collective-
bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be 
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the 
 
 40. Elizabeth A. Roma, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses In Employment 
Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review (hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses), 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 536 n.124 (2004); see Steelworkers II, 
363 U.S. at 568 (“Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract 
interpretation for the arbitrator.”). 
 41. Steelworkers II, 363 U.S. at 568. 
 42. Id. at 569. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court 
declined to enforce a labor arbitration agreement as the sole means for redressing a statutory 
dispute under a CBA. The worker complained that he had been terminated because of racial 
discrimination. The Court held, simply, “that there can be no prospective waiver of an 
employee’s rights under Title VII.” Id. at 51. Elaborating, the Court stated that some 
statutory rights may be waivable, but only those rights related to a “collective activity” or a 
“majoritarian process[],” such as the right to strike. Id. 
 45. Id. at 58 n.19. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  10:06 AM 
1011 Arbitration Awards 
 1019 
bargaining unit.”46 
Gardner-Denver decided that an individual was not barred from 
litigating a discrimination claim in his own right even after his union 
arbitrated the claim.47 
Seventeen years later, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.48 
reevaluated the anti-arbitration reasoning that emerged from 
Gardner-Denver. The Gilmer Court held that a non-union worker’s 
statutory claim could be subjected, exclusively, to a mandatory 
arbitration agreement.49 Thus the Supreme Court distinguished the 
analysis used in Gardner-Denver which was that arbitration 
agreements stemming from statutory claims of non-collective rights 
are unenforceable.50 Regardless of how genuine the distinctions51 
between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer are, Gilmer is emblematic of a 
newly adopted pro-arbitration policy by the Supreme Court.52 
 
 46. Carol Van Sambeek, The Four Corners Approach to Judging the Enforceability of 
Arbitration Agreements, Which Waive Statutory Rights to Litigate Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 247, 253–54 (2006) (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 
n.19). 
 47. 415 U.S. at 59–60. 
 48. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 49. Id. at 23. 
 50. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51. 
 51. The Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on three grounds. First, the issue 
in Gardner-Denver was whether resolution of a contractual claim in an arbitral forum 
precluded subsequent resolution of that claim in a judicial forum. Although the Gardner-
Denver Court had ruled that arbitration of a contractual claim did not eliminate one’s right to 
a day in court for a statutory claim, the situation in Gilmer involved an employee who had 
specifically agreed to arbitrate his statutory claims. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. Second, Gardner-
Denver was decided “in the context of a collective bargaining agreement . . . . An important 
concern therefore was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory 
rights, a concern not applicable to the present case.” Id. Third, Gardner-Denver was not 
decided under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 234 (“The landmark cases in labor and 
employment arbitration—Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (the ‘old time religion’) and 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (the ‘new age’ thinking)—attest to the enormous 
distance that separates past and present concepts of legal due process and fundamental 
rights.”); Gavin, supra note 20, at 255 (“The 1991 landmark decision in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. illustrates just how far the Court had come since its refusal to 
apply the FAA to contracts involving the Securities Act in Wilko.” (footnote omitted)); 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 40, at 525 (“[T]he [Gilmer] Court’s attitude 
towards arbitration was distinctively different [from the attitude of the Gardner-Denver Court] 
. . . .”). 
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In the 1998 case of Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,53 
the Supreme Court tried to reconcile the discordance between 
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. The union employee had brought a 
statutory lawsuit against his employer for violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, and the employer had argued that the litigation 
was precluded by the arbitration agreement included in the union’s 
CBA.54 For union-based arbitration agreements, the Court 
introduced a “clear and unmistakable waiver” test to determine if the 
arbitration agreement precluded litigation of statutory claims,55 thus 
placing primary importance on the construction of the actual labor 
contract. Since the union’s CBA with the employer contained only a 
generalized arbitration clause, the employee was entitled to litigate 
his claim in court.56 The Court declined, however, to rule that a 
statutory discrimination claim could never be relegated to 
arbitration, expressly reserving that question for another day.57 
The reason why the “clear and unmistakable waiver of rights” 
test applied only to CBAs helped to reconcile Gardner-Denver with 
Gilmer: although both cases involved an employee’s waiver of the 
right to litigate statutory rights in an arbitration agreement, 
Gardner-Denver involved a union’s waiver of statutory rights, while 
Gilmer involved an individual’s waiver.58 
 We think the [clear and unmistakable waiver] standard [is] 
applicable to a union-negotiated waiver of employees’ statutory 
right to a judicial forum for claims of employment 
discrimination. . . . [W]hether or not Gardner-Denver’s seemingly 
absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees’ federal forum 
rights survives Gilmer, Gardner-Denver at least stands for the 
proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient 
importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver 
in a CBA.59 
Wright is significant to the topic of judicial review of arbitration 
agreements (and arbitration awards) for two reasons. First, it 
 
 53. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75–77 (1998). 
 54. Id. at 72–75. 
 55. Id. at 80. 
 56. See id. at 82. 
 57. Id. at 82 n.2. 
 58. Id. at 80. 
 59. Id. 
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explicitly stated the key rationale for presuming arbitrability in labor 
disputes: “arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret 
the terms of a CBA.”60 Second and more importantly, the Wright 
Court established a tiered standard for enforcing arbitration 
agreements under a CBA versus an individual employment contract: 
a waiver of the right to litigate a statutory claim in court must be 
clear and unmistakable if it is within a CBA; this does not apply for 
an individual waiver of statutory rights.61 
 Presumably, the non-represented employee is bound by the 
terms of the arbitration agreement that he or she supposedly 
negotiates, or at least assents to, and therefore that employee 
should be aware of any waiver contained within that agreement. 
However, because the union, not its represented employees, 
negotiates a CBA, any waiver of statutory rights has to be clear so 
that the employees will be aware of these terms when they vote on 
the CBA.62 
Furthermore, the union provides an additional “layer of 
bureaucracy” that employees must overcome to assert their rights.63 
The Wright Court emphasized that the waiver of statutory rights by 
the union be “clear and unmistakable” so as to eliminate confusion 
over the power of the union to arbitrate statutory claims in the place 
of the workers.64 
 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett65 may have blunted Gardner-
Denver’s recognition that a union does not always represent an 
employee’s best interests, but it left intact Wright’s distantly 
correlative two-tiered approach to enforcing arbitration agreements. 
At issue was whether a CBA that clearly and unmistakably called for 
arbitration of an Age Discrimination and Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) claim was enforceable.66 In answering in the affirmative 
(and reversing the lower courts’ decisions), the Supreme Court 
rejected the idea that discrimination claims may never be relegated to 
 
 60. Id. at 78. The Court referenced two cases to support this proposition: AT&T Tech., 
Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), and Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 581–
82 (1960). 
 61. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80–81. 
 62. Van Sambeek, supra note 46, at 255. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65.  129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 66.  Id. at 1461. 
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arbitration in a CBA.67 Inasmuch as the waiver of the right to litigate 
in the CBA was clear and unmistakable68 (and the ADEA contained 
no independent bar to arbitration), the respondents’ age 
discrimination claims were properly subjected to arbitration.69 
 While 14 Penn Plaza answered the unresolved question from 
Wright (statutory claims may indeed be subject to mandatory 
arbitration in a CBA), it simultaneously retreated from Gardner-
Denver’s “broad dicta . . . highly critical of the use of arbitration for 
the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights.”70 In particular, 
the 14 Penn Plaza Court rejected three specific strands of anti-
arbitration dicta in Garden-Denver. First, “an agreement to submit 
statutory discrimination claims to arbitration [is not] tantamount to 
a waiver of those rights.”71 Second, it is a misconception that 
arbitrators are unqualified to decide legal questions; rather it is 
within the “arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact 
and law.”72 Third, while it may be true, as Gardner-Denver suggests, 
that “a union [in arbitration] may subordinate the interests of an 
individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the 
bargaining unit,” that “judicial policy concern” is an insufficient 
“source of authority” for limiting the application of an arbitration 
agreement.73 
 Significantly, Wright’s two-tiered approach to enforcing 
arbitration agreements (under a CBA, they must be clear and 
unmistakable; not so for an individual employee) is only 
strengthened by the 14 Penn Plaza holding.74 Thus, while Gardner-
 
 67.  Id. at 1464. 
 68.  The 14 Penn Plaza respondents argued that the waiver was not, in fact, clear and 
unmistakable, but the Court refused to consider this argument, since it had not been raised 
below. Id. at 1473–74. 
 69.  Id. at 1466. 
 70.  Id. at 1469. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 1471. 
 73.  Id. at 1472. 
 74.  In the following quotation, the first sentence, taken out of context, would seem to 
belie this assertion, but the second sentence qualifies the first and sanctions Wright’s tiered 
approach: “Nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration 
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative. 
This Court has required only that an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims 
be ‘explicitly stated’ in the collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 1465 (quoting Wright v. 
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)). 
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Denver’s broad dicta make it “a strong candidate for overruling,”75 
the emergent standard of review for arbitration agreements indirectly 
contemplates the possibility of disunity between the union and 
employee: the requirement that there be a “clear and unmistakable” 
waiver of the right to litigate in a CBA assures that the individual 
employee will be personally aware of the arbitration agreement when 
she votes on the CBA, even though it is the union that negotiates 
the CBA.76 Thus, by imposing additional requirements on arbitration 
agreements contained within CBAs, the judiciary has made it harder 
to have an enforceable arbitration agreement within a CBA than in 
an individual worker’s contract. 
B. The Development of the “Manifest Disregard of Law” Standard for 
Arbitration Awards 
1. Historically, arbitration awards receive general acceptance 
While arbitration agreements have ultimately become enforceable 
for unions only after proving a clear and unmistakable waiver of 
rights, arbitration awards have historically enjoyed—and still 
receive—a higher level of deference. English courts gave “full effect 
to [arbitration] agreements . . . after they had ripened into 
arbitrators’ awards.”77 American courts likewise seldom overturned 
the completed award of an arbitrator.78 That the parties had 
voluntarily79 submitted to the arbitration itself (rather than in the 
context of a future, executory agreement) infused the arbitration 
award with a contract-like character that won approval and 
enforcement from both English and American courts.80 The FAA, in 
 
 75.  Id. at 1469 n.8. 
 76.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 77. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 
1942). 
 78. Gavin, supra note 20, at 251 n.15 (citing IAN R. MCNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—INTERNALIZATION 20 (1992)). 
 79. “Voluntarily” because either party could revoke the executory arbitration agreement 
at any time. Id. at 252. 
 80. One reason for the substantial deference given arbitration awards under the 
common law of early American and English courts may have been the contract-like character of 
the completed award. An 1845 Massachusetts court decision may reference contractual 
principles when it delineates between “awards . . . fairly and lawfully made” and compulsion of 
“a reluctant party to submit to [an arbitral] tribunal”: 
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turn, though not drafted specifically to address the issue of judicial 
review of arbitration awards,81 did outline four bases for overturning 
a completed award: (1) “the award was procured by corruption [or] 
fraud”; (2) the award evidences “partiality or corruption” of the 
arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators are “guilty of misconduct” or 
prejudicial behavior, such as “refusing to postpone [a] hearing” or 
hear pertinent evidence; and (4) “the arbitrators [have] exceeded 
their powers, or . . . imperfectly executed them.”82 
2. “Manifest disregard of law” emerges as a check on arbitration 
awards 
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan.83 Although 
in dicta,84 the Wilko Court created the “manifest disregard of law” 
standard: a court will not overturn an arbitration award unless the 
arbitrator’s decision displays a “manifest disregard” of law.85 The 
 
Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party specifically to perform 
an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to discourage arbitrations, as 
against public policy. On the contrary, they have and can have no just objection to 
these domestic forums, and will enforce, and promptly interfere to enforce their 
awards when fairly and lawfully made, without hesitation or question. But when 
they are asked to proceed farther and to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators 
whose award shall be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals 
possess adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel a 
reluctant party to submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him the doors of 
the common courts of justice, provided by the government to protect rights and to 
redress wrongs.  
  . . . [I]f a submission has been made to arbitrators . . . with an express 
stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it still is revocable and 
countermandable, by either party, before the award is actually made, although not 
afterwards. 
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320–21 (C.C. Mass. 1845). 
 81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2008). 
 82. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1–4) (2008). 
 83. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The investor claimed that the company had 
made false representations and thereby induced him to purchase stock on false pretenses. The 
Court found that the arbitration agreement specifically violated the Securities Act of 1933, 
which forbad mandatory arbitration in stock-purchase agreements, and therefore refused to 
compel arbitration. Id. at 428–31, 434–38. Wilko was eventually overruled for reasons 
unrelated to this Comment by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989). 
 84. Justice Jackson found the Court’s exposition of possible reasons to overturn an 
arbitral award to be unnecessary to the decision; he therefore wrote a separate concurrence to 
demonstrate his support for the limited holding that the Securities Act of 1933 precludes pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438–39 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 436–37. 
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“manifest disregard of law” standard has become the touchstone for 
judicial review of arbitral awards.86 Notably, section 10 of the FAA, 
which lists the bases for vacating an arbitration award, mentions 
nothing of “manifest disregard of law”—lower federal courts seeking 
to implement this standard of review have shoe-horned it in with 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4): an arbitration award may be vacated if “the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers.”87 Thus, although “manifest 
disregard of law” was coined in a case that did not deal with 
arbitration awards, it has become the shorthand for the FAA’s 
undergirding principle of judicial review of arbitration awards. 
3. Steelworkers III lays the foundation for giving CBA-based 
arbitration awards extra deference 
While Wilko produced an easily repeatable standard for judicial 
review of arbitration awards, Steelworkers III88 set the stage for CBA-
based arbitration awards to receive extra deference. In contrast to its 
companion cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Steelworkers III 
decision enforced an arbitration award—not an agreement—that 
had been overturned by a lower court.89 Four aspects of Steelworkers 
III are noteworthy in this context—four markers why CBA-based 
arbitration awards have received extra deference. 
 
a. The premise of Steelworkers III: the bargained-for arbitration 
award. In enforcing the arbitration award, the Supreme Court 
explicitly stated a basic premise relating to CBA-based arbitration 
awards: the arbitrator’s award was bargained for in the sense that it 
represents what the parties (employer and union) get in exchange for 
 
 86. See, e.g., First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
 87. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 
933–34 (2d Cir. 1986). This case has been criticized insofar as it portrayed “manifest disregard 
of the law” as an additional, judicially created ground for overturning an arbitration award. 
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Oxford Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
The criticism is well founded: in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme 
Court ruled that the FAA’s stated grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exclusive. 128 
S. Ct. 1396, 1402–03 (2008). Thus “manifest disregard of the law” is significant as a standard 
of review only to the extent that it serves as a shorthand for the FAA’s stated grounds for 
vacatur. Whether the Hall Street decision will produce a measurable change in judicial scrutiny 
of arbitration awards remains to be seen. 
 88. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp. (Steelworkers III), 363 
U.S. 593 (1960). 
 89. Id. at 595–96, 598–99. 
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what they give under the collective bargaining agreement.90 “It is the 
arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the 
arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts 
have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the 
contract is different from his.”91 
 
b. The rationale of Steelworkers III: pro-arbitration policy and 
superior qualification. Next, the Supreme Court made explicit its 
rationale for upholding the arbitration award: if courts interfered in 
the arbitration award, then that would undermine the policy of 
settling labor disputes by arbitration.92 Arbitrators, furthermore, are 
qualified to resolve such disputes because of their specialized 
knowledge in the industry.93 
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration 
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective 
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor 
disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had 
the final say on the merits of the awards. . . . They sit to 
settle disputes at the plant level—disputes that require for 
their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a 
particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in 
particular agreements.94 
 
c. The mixed authority of Steelworkers III: references to arbitration 
agreements. Notably, the Court cites Steelworkers I, an arbitration 
agreement-enforcement case, to explain its reasoning for enforcing 
an arbitration award.95 Ostensibly, employment of specialized 
knowledge to foster industrial stability favors upholding both 
arbitration agreements and arbitration awards. “As we stated in 
[Steelworkers I], . . . decided this day, the arbitrators under these 
collective agreements are indispensable agencies in a continuous 
collective bargaining process.”96 This is significant because it shows 
 
 90. Id. at 599. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 596, 599. 
 93. Id. at 596. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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that, at least at one point in time, the Supreme Court employed the 
same reasons to justify enforcing arbitration agreements as it did to 
justify enforcing arbitration awards. 
 
d. The timing of Steelworkers III: before the divergence of levels of 
scrutiny for arbitration awards and arbitration agreements. The 
Steelworkers Trilogy was decided fourteen years before the arbitration 
agreement rationale and arbitration award rationale began to 
diverge, when the Gardner-Denver Court observed in a footnote 
that under a CBA, “the interests of the individual employee may be 
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the 
bargaining unit.”97 It would be an additional twenty-four years 
before the Gardner-Denver footnote ripened into a split approach to 
arbitration agreement enforcement in Wright; namely, that in order 
to enforce arbitration agreements under a CBA (but not for an 
individual worker), there must be a “clear and unmistakable waiver” 
of the right to litigate a statutory claim in court.98 The arbitration 
award-enforcement cases since Steelworkers III (discussed 
immediately below) show that no analogous judicial suspicion has 
arisen with respect to arbitration awards given under a CBA. In fact, 
they are subject to less judicial scrutiny. 
4. The “manifest disregard of law” standard takes on a different 
meaning for CBA-based arbitration awards 
Nine years after Steelworkers III, the Third Circuit decided 
Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, and ruled that the 
district court erred by overturning the ruling of an arbitrator 
concerning the promotion of a union employee.99 Although the 
Fletcher court claimed to recycle the “manifest disregard of the law” 
standard from Wilko,100 the court found that the presence of a CBA 
reduced the scrutiny that arbitration awards should be subject to: 
 
 97. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974). 
 98. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998). 
 99. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1125, 1133 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 100. Id. at 1127–28 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (overruled on 
other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989))). 
Wilko was decided under the FAA, 346 U.S. at 436, while Fletcher was decided under the 
LMRA, 405 F.2d at 1125 n.1. For a brief discussion of the overlap of rationale, see supra note 
21. 
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[P]erceiving that the Supreme Court’s announced standards 
in reviewing commercial awards call for the exercise of 
judicial restraint, we must conclude that such a philosophy of 
restricted review compels even less judicial interference in 
matters arising from labor arbitration. At the very least this 
means that the interpretation of labor arbitrators must not be 
disturbed so long as they are not in “manifest disregard” of 
the law, and that “whether the arbitrators misconstrued a 
contract” does not open the award to judicial review.101  
Thus, the Fletcher court openly adopted a highly deferential 
standard of review for arbitration awards made within a CBA. 
Although not dealing specifically with judicial review of 
arbitration awards in the CBA context, Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson 
Navigation Co.102 further eroded the meaning of the “manifest 
disregard of law” standard. In Sun Ship, the Third Circuit cited its 
previous ruling in Fletcher103 for the proposition that a court may not 
“consider whether the arbitrators committed an error of law.”104 
Judicial review of arbitrators’ contractual interpretations was likewise 
broadly proscribed.105 Since a Third Circuit judge may not consider 
whether arbitrators have made errors of either law or contract 
interpretation under the current terms of “manifest disregard of 
law,” the juridical apple has fallen far from the initial tree. Ironically, 
then, the “manifest disregard of law” standard has become 
synonymous with a standard that nearly forecloses judicial review 
entirely—a super-deference. 
Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, District 31106 
represents a similar development in the Fourth Circuit in the CBA 
context. The court reversed the decision of the District Court, 
finding that the District Court had improperly undertaken to 
interpret the language of a CBA and of legal precedent.107 The 
Upshur Coals Court acknowledged, “The arbitrators’ interpretation 
 
 101. Fletcher, 405 F.2d at 1128 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 102. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 103. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 104. Sun Ship, 785 F.2d at 62 (citing Fletcher, 405 F.2d at 1127–28). 
 105. Id. (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (“The 
court may not take issue with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract.”)). 
 106. Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
 107. Id. at 226, 230. 
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of the contract, and of [legal precedent] may not have been 
correct,”108 but “‘[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably 
construing or applying the contract’ a court may not vacate the 
arbitrator’s judgment.”109 
In International Association of Machinists, No. 145 v. Modern Air 
Transport, Inc., the Fifth Circuit likewise adopted a rationale that 
gave super-deference to arbitration awards made under a CBA.110 
The court found that since “[i]t is the arbitrator’s construction 
which was bargained for,” the proper role of the judiciary was to 
evaluate whether or not the arbitrators had exceeded their authority, 
not whether they had correctly interpreted the collective bargaining 
contract.111 This bifurcation is important: a court may review 
whether or not an arbitrator was authorized to arbitrate a certain 
issue, but a court may not review (save in very limited instances) 
whether the arbitrator gave a proper interpretation of the CBA.112 In 
this case, the court found that an arbitrator was still acting in his 
authority, even though it would have interpreted the contract 
differently.113 The Machinists court’s super-deference exceeded the 
standard of review of abuse of discretion in that it deferred to the 
arbitrator’s interpretation of both the CBA and legal precedent. 
5. Cole v. Burns repackages the reasons for giving extra deference to 
CBA-based arbitration awards 
Cole v. Burns is noteworthy, because, although its discussion of 
the reasons for giving CBA-based arbitration awards a high degree of 
deference114 is dicta, it re-establishes the judiciary’s prevailing reasons 
for treating CBA-based arbitration decisions differently from (with 
more deference than) other arbitration awards. The opinion outlines 
three broad arguments: first, arbitration is the alternative to striking 
for workers employed under a CBA; second, a CBA is akin to a 
micro social contract wherein the arbitrator’s award is an extension 
of the agreement itself; third, arbitration within a CBA is more likely 
 
 108. Id. at 231. 
 109. Id. at 229 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 
(1987)). 
 110. 495 F.2d 1241, 1244–45 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 111. Id. at 1244 (quoting Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)). 
 112. Id. at 1244–45. 
 113. Id. at 1244. 
 114. 105 F.3d 1465, 1473–79 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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to result in a just award than arbitration in the case of the non-
unionized worker or even in the case of a judge. 
 
a. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because 
labor arbitration is the alternative to mass, industry-wide strikes. First, 
Cole asserts that “[i]n the commercial case, arbitration is the 
substitute for litigation. Here [under a CBA] arbitration is the 
substitute for industrial strife.”115 This resonates with the original 
sentiment for passing the LMRA. In the years immediately following 
World War II, “more than five million [American] workers 
participated in the largest strike wave ever in an advanced capitalist 
nation.”116 Congress perceived a need to rein in the power of 
organized labor to strike so freely, and so passed the Labor 
Management Relations Act,117 which includes a pro-arbitration 
provision that applies specifically to labor unions.118 Thus Cole’s 
arbitration-or-strike dichotomy has a pedigree that dates back at least 
to the passage of the LMRA. 
Unfortunately, neither Cole nor Steelworkers III (which originally 
stated the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy) makes explicit the 
connection between (1) the proposition that arbitration is needed to 
avert industry-stopping strikes, and (2) the idea that CBA-based 
arbitration decisions should be awarded a high degree of deference. 
Presumably, the connection is that if arbitration decisions are not 
given substantial deference, then organized labor will have no 
incentive to arbitrate and will strike instead. 
 
b. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because the 
CBA is a mini-social contract. Second, Cole combines rationale from 
Steelworkers I and III to show that the authority of a CBA transcends 
the mere words of the contract to the point where it is a mini-social 
contract, the constitution and government for an entire micro-
society. There are two aspects of the CBA, as envisioned in Cole (and 
its cited sources), that are more like a mini-social contract than a 
mere lengthy contract. First, the CBA is expected to form a new 
 
 115. Id. at 1473 (quoting Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)). 
 116. Harris Freeman, Program Notes: In the Shadow of Antilabor Law: Organizing and 
Collective Bargaining 60 Years After Taft-Hartley, 11 WORKINGUSA 1, 2 (2008). 
 117. Id. 
 118. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  10:06 AM 
1011 Arbitration Awards 
 1031 
common law that goes beyond interpretation of the agreement. 
“The collective bargaining agreement . . . is more than a contract; it 
is a generalized code to govern myriad cases which the draftsmen 
cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole 
employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law—the 
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.”119 
Second, the CBA-designated arbitration agreement imbues the 
arbitrator with authority that is disconnected and independent of her 
ability to interpret statutory law or contracts. 
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s 
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s 
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no 
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract 
is different from his.120  
The Cole court further found that a bad contract interpretation 
by the arbitrator is oxymoronic: “Thus, a ‘misinterpretation’ or 
‘gross mistake’ by the arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In 
the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority on the part of 
the arbitrator, he is speaking for the parties, and his award is their 
contract.”121 Because a union has specifically bargained for the 
agreement to arbitrate as part of the CBA, the arbitration award is an 
inseparable part of the employment social contract thus brought into 
being. 
 
c. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because 
they are more likely to result in a correct decision than a judicial 
award. Third, Cole lists various reasons why arbitration within a CBA 
is more likely to result in a better or more just award than other 
forms of arbitration or even a formal judgment. An arbitrator has 
specialized knowledge of the law of the shop that qualifies him 
beyond even the “ablest judge” because the arbitrator can take into 
account “such factors as the effect upon productivity . . . [and] the 
 
 119. Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 578–79 (1960). 
 120. Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). 
 121. Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Theodore J. St. 
Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and 
Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977)). 
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morale of the shop.”122 And with respect to arbitration conducted by 
the non-unionized employee, a union is more likely to obtain a fair 
award at arbitration because the union is a repeat customer, while 
the individual employee generally has only one shot.123 Because the 
union is a repeat player, it is better able to pick a non-biased 
arbitrator.124 While an individual employee may be presented with an 
arbitration clause “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,” a union not only 
bargains for the arbitration agreement, but can return to the 
bargaining table after an unfavorable award to restructure the 
employment agreement.125 
Cole concludes that an arbitration award rendered for an 
individual not under a CBA would be subject to a rigorous “manifest 
disregard of the law” standard of review that would include actively 
asking if the arbitrator had applied the correct law.126 Thus, the Cole 
court envisioned a return to the more intuitive definition of 
“manifest disregard of the law” (i.e., an actual inquiry into whether 
the law has been disregarded), but only for workers not within a 
union. 
C. In Sum: Divergent Trends in the Enforcement of CBA-based 
Arbitration Agreements and CBA-based Arbitration Awards 
Thus, the rationales surrounding enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and enforcement of arbitration awards have developed 
divergently. When the Steelworkers Trilogy was decided in 1960, the 
Supreme Court offered similar rationale for all three cases, even 
though two dealt with enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
(Steelworkers I and II), and one dealt with enforcement of an 
arbitration award (Steelworkers III). By the time Wright was decided 
thirty-eight years later, an agreement to arbitrate under a CBA had to 
be clear and unmistakable—a higher threshold than that imposed for 
arbitration of an individual claim. Meanwhile, an arbitration award 
made in the context of a CBA fell under a modified “manifest 
disregard of the law” standard of review that is less rigorous than the 
 
 122. Id. (quoting Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. at 582 (1960)). 
 123. Id. at 1475–76. 
 124. Id. at 1475. 
 125. Id. at 1477. 
 126. Id. at 1487. 
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“manifest disregard of the law”127 test that courts apply to 
individuals. 
III. AN ENVIRONMENT OF COMPULSORY UNIONIZATION VITIATES 
THE REASONS FOR GIVING CBA-BASED ARBITRATION AWARDS A 
HIGH DEGREE OF DEFERENCE 
A. A Review of Compulsory Unionization Laws 
The LMRA is a group of amendments to the National Labor 
Relations Act.128 Closed-shop arrangements were legal under the 
original NLRA passed in 1935: “[N]othing in this Act . . . or in any 
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from 
making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a 
condition of employment membership therein. . . .”129 Thus the 
unamended NLRA left the door open—intentionally or 
otherwise130—for state laws providing for compulsory unionization. 
When the LMRA was passed twelve years later, § 14(b) was added to 
the NLRA, forbidding “agreements requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory 
in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or 
Territorial law.”131 This did not, however, prove the end of 
compulsory unionization. Unions were still able to form “union 
shop” agreements in which a non-union employee could be hired on 
the condition that he or she join the union within a certain amount 
of time. Hence, while “closed shop” may be a misnomer in a 
technical sense (the shop is not closed from the outset to prospective 
non-union employees), the practical effect of union shop laws is the 
same: ultimately the worker must join the union or cease 
employment under either arrangement. 
 
 127.  But “manifest disregard of the law” may no longer be a viable shorthand name for 
the judiciary’s approach to overturning arbitration awards since the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). Whether this will 
result in a substantive change to that approach remains to be seen. See supra note 87. 
 128. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
 129. Nat’l Labor Relations Act 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 
158 (2009)).  
 130. One commentator has implied that it may have been unintentional. See Raymond L. 
Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert 
Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 
104–05 (2005). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2008). 
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In 1985, however, the Supreme Court decided Pattern Makers’ 
v. NLRB, in which it ruled that even where a closed-shop 
authorization election has been held, employees could not be fined 
for resigning from the union.132 The Court found that fining former 
union members effected restraint and coercion on the part of the 
union, in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.133 For reasons that 
will be discussed in Part B below, Pattern Makers’ has not been the 
death knell for the closed shop; union and worker behavior have 
largely continued unaltered since the Supreme Court’s ruling. By 
using the phrases “compulsory unionism” or “closed shop,” this 
Comment merely asserts that after a closed-shop authorization 
election, at least some workers who otherwise would not have joined 
the union do so against their preference. Other legal commentators 
likewise continue to use the phrase “closed shop.”134 
Currently, twenty-two states have laws that forbid closed-shop 
arrangements.135 In the remaining states, workers wishing to 
establish a closed-shop workplace must vote.136 Two kinds of 
elections must take place. First, a majority of workers must vote to 
create a union.137 This is called a certification election. Second, once 
a union has been certified, the workers in a workplace may vote to 
 
 132. 473 U.S. 95, 115–16 (1985). 
 133. Id. at 114. 
 134. For example, the American Law Reports annotation “Closed Shops and Closed 
Unions,” though written in 1946, has been revised as recently as 2008 and continues to say: 
Whatever may have been the law in earlier times, today it is settled in most 
jurisdictions that as a general proposition, a closed-shop agreement, that is, a 
collective labor agreement which binds the employer to employ only members of a 
single labor union, is a valid contract, and not void as in restraint of trade or against 
public policy. 
160 A.L.R. 918 (1946) (footnotes omitted). Thus, “[t]he closed shop is a generic term. It 
covers a variety of practices which contain a common element. That element is that to obtain 
or retain a job an employee must join a trade union, or in other words, union membership is a 
condition of employment.” CHARLES HANSON ET AL., THE CLOSED SHOP: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND TRADE UNION SECURITY IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND WEST 
GERMANY 5 (1982). By using the phrase “closed shop” in the “generic” sense, this Comment 
does not focus on the exception created in Pattern Makers’, but rather on the continuing 
reality of “join or quit,” demonstrated in Part B of this section. 
 135. Hogler, supra note 130, at 136. 
 136. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 175. 
 137. That a majority of workers would be required to agree for there to be any union 
(whether or not the union is to represent them) is a consequence of the exclusivity rule: a 
union is the exclusive representative of all employees in a workplace in matters of bargaining 
for wages and benefits. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).  
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close the shop (requiring union membership (barring proactive 
resignation from the employee) and paying union dues as a 
condition for continued employment). This is called an 
authorization election. Because of this, if more than half of the 
workers vote to authorize a closed shop, all other employees must 
join the union, cease employment, or proactively resign union 
membership.138 The next two parts will demonstrate that because of 
this arrangement, in the twenty-eight states that permit closed-shop 
arrangements, the Gardner-Denver Court’s observation that there 
may exist tension between the union and the employee139 is more 
probable. 
B. The Effect of Closed-Shop Conditions 
The closed-shop work setting leads to a high enough likelihood 
of opposition and enmity between employer and union to warrant 
greater scrutiny than the current “manifest disregard of law” 
standard of review.140 Although some of the analysis supporting this 
proposition is supportable (and supported) by empirical evidence, 
this premise is axiomatic at its core. The following three lemmas 
form a bulwark for this premise: (1) at least some closed-shop 
certifying elections are decided by non-unanimous vote, in which 
some workers will either be compelled to join the union against their 
will or cease employment; (2) conditions before a closed-shop 
certifying election have a tendency to produce enmity between 
employees because of (a) strikes in which some of the non-union 
workers (scabs) continue to work, (b) violence against scabs during 
strikes, or (c) campaigning by parties on each side of the issue; and 
(3) once the closed shop has become a reality, it is unrealistic to 
expect the employee-to-employee opposition to immediately 
vaporize. 
 
 138. Hanson and his co-authors describe the reality of join-or-quit in great detail. 
HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 111–42. However, since they wrote before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pattern Makers’, they fail to include the option of active resignation from 
the trade union. See infra notes 145, 148. 
 139. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974). 
 140. This Comment does not assert, however, that a higher standard of review is not also 
justified under an open shop. As mentioned in note 13, supra, this Comment focuses on closed 
shops because they are more demonstrably illustrative of the possibility of a divergence of 
interest between worker and employer than open shops. 
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1. At least some closed-shop authorizing elections are decided by non-
unanimous vote, in which some workers will be compelled to either join 
the union against their will or cease employment 
The part of this proposition that pertains to non-unanimous 
votes is, predictably, much weaker than it could be. One study of 
union-certification elections141 voting demographics uncovered a 
very mixed field sentiment on the desirability of unions among 
voting workers.142 Among thirty-three elections studied, the highest 
percentage of workers voting for union-representation was seventy-
six percent.143 Twenty-two out of the thirty-three elections voted 
against union representation, and overall, only forty-five percent of 
all workers were in favor of union representation.144 While 
dispositions toward unions varied from election to election, the only 
constant was that voting among workers was not unanimous. 
Though lack of unanimity is easy to demonstrate, as mentioned 
above, it is not true, in the technical sense, that workers are forced to 
join the union in a closed shop. Despite the Supreme Court’s 
sweeping ruling in Pattern Makers’, “join or quit” continues to be 
the prevailing mentality in workplaces that have held a successful 
closed-shop authorization election.145 The following three factors 
may be responsible for this: First, it is not clear to workers that they 
have the option of withdrawing from a union because they are still 
required to pay union dues under a closed shop.146 Second, union 
 
 141. Union certification elections are not the same thing as closed-shop authorization 
elections, although they have a similar dynamic. In a union certification election, employees 
vote not whether to make their workplace a closed shop, but whether to have a union 
representing workers at all. BARBARA KATE REPA, YOUR RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 460 
(2007). Even in an open shop, the union is the exclusive representative of the workers to the 
employer in terms of wage bargaining. 
 142. JULIUS G. GETMAN, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, AND JEANNE B. HERMAN, UNION 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 41 tbl.2-2 (1976). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 40, 41 tbl.2-2. 
 145. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. lists “Can I be 
required to be a union member or pay dues?” at the top of its FAQ list, http://www. 
nrtw.org/. Pundits from the other side also seek to clarify this misconception. See, e.g., 
WrongforMichigan.org, http://www.wrongformichigan.org/Get_The_Facts.htm (“The 
Right to Work supporters keep talking about ‘compulsory’ unionism. Do all workers have to 
be union members when there is a union security clause in a contract?”). Evidently, advocates 
on both sides have found that the matter requires clarification. 
 146. In Communication Workers v. Beck, the Supreme Court ruled that self-removing 
employees may still be required to pay agency dues, or the amount of union dues that covers 
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members often refuse to work alongside non-union members, thus 
forcing employers to choose between hiring all union workers, or no 
union workers at all.147 Third, since Pattern Makers’ was handed 
down in 1985, the bulk of the historical dialog on the fairness of 
closed-shop laws assumes that union membership may be required. 
For example, in 1957, the AFL-CIO published the following: 
 Nobody is deprived of any job because of the union shop, unless 
the individual himself decides to make non-membership in a union 
a condition for accepting a job. 
 Joining a union is only one of many qualifications involved in 
getting a job. For instance, the worker may be required to have a 
certain level of education . . . he may have to be willing to wear 
certain types of uniform or work clothes. . . .148 
Other factors may also be relevant, such as the fact that 
employees must proactively resign from a union after a successful 
closed-shop authorization election,149 or that the prevailing terms 
“open shop” and “closed shop” have a somewhat non-intuitive 
meaning. This Comment merely asserts that, unless an employee 
deliberately resigns from the union, the losing party in a successful 
closed-shop authorization election joins the union against his will. 
 
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment with the employer. 
487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988). An employee who does not want to pay the entire fee is 
required to follow a formal objection procedure. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 147.  
Closed shop bylaws are common in industries such as construction and 
entertainment, where jobs are often temporary and the maintenance of closed shop 
conditions is important to ensure stability of employment. Members generally 
comply with the bylaws by protesting at the presence of non-union employees, by 
walking off the job where non-unionists are present or by refusing to work with 
employers using non-union labor. 
HANSON ET AL, supra note 134, at 172. Of course, this option is available to union members 
in both closed- and open-shop settings. 
 148. WILLIAM TAYLOR HARRISON, THE TRUTH ABOUT RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 72 
(1959) (quoting AFL-CIO, FACTS VS. PROPAGANDA (1957)). 
 149. See generally Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 133 F.3d at 1012. 
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2. Conditions before a closed-shop authorization election may tend to 
produce enmity among employees 
a. Strikes and hard feelings against scabs. From an axiomatic150 
perspective, unions—including those that choose to hold an 
authorization election—will resent scabs. Indeed, the unions that 
have the greatest reason to show antipathy toward scabs may be 
more likely to hold an authorization election, since closing the shop 
may be a more desirable goal when an unsuccessful (scab-broken) 
strike is in the memorable past. 
During a congressional hearing on union policy, one union 
worker testified, 
The “free rider” is the living example of the bad side of human 
nature which takes everything it can get for free . . . I merely say 
that as long as a fellow worker of mine, working side by side with 
me in a shop . . . as long as he is getting exactly the same benefits 
that I am getting from the activities of our organization . . . that is 
preposterous, merely because I happened to be a person, an 
individual, that has some integrity and is willing to pay my share, 
my dues, that some person . . . that has no sense of responsibility to 
his fellow man, . . . should actually be allowed just to sit there and 
not only let things go by but actually laugh in my face.151 
One survey found that seventy percent of union workers found it 
ethical to put pressure on non-unionists to join the union by refusing 
to work with them.152 
b. Strikes and hard feelings felt by scabs. Scabs are treated poorly 
by striking workers. A good example of this species of ill treatment is 
the factual setting of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, in which union 
 
 150. The continued reference to self-evident or axiomatic lemmas may be annoying and 
frustrating to academic researchers. The author apologizes and makes three observations. First, 
no quantitative research has been performed (that he could find) on the frequency or 
prevalence of hard feelings between unionists and non-unionists, residual enmity after a strike, 
or (ultimately) overall likelihood of a union to treat its members unfairly; indeed, the author 
questions whether one could fairly expect such topics to be researchable. Second, while 
anecdotal evidence is plentiful, the plural of anecdote is not data. Therefore, this Comment 
purposefully places its axiomatic reasoning before isolated quotations and statistics that 
corroborate—but do not directly establish—the assertion of residual hard feelings. Third, by 
explicitly stating its underlying assumptions, this Comment invites reasoned academic dialog 
and criticism that gets at the foundation of the desirability of union-led grievance procedures. 
 151. CHAMBERLIN ET AL., LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 72 (1958) (quoting 
Testimony of Paul E. Monahan, representing the United Railroad Workers of America, CIO). 
 152. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 83. 
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members physically beat an organizer of a different union for trying 
to organize mine work in opposition to a strike.153 
c. Campaigning by parties on each side of the issue. Even in the 
absence of a strike, a campaign may foment feelings of opposition 
between employees. After a close but unsuccessful certification 
election in Albion, Indiana, a news report found that although 
[t]he matter was settled, . . . the bruising battle in Albion . . . 
turned friend against friend. One employee says that the card check 
process made her a target and she was threatened by other 
employees who wanted the union. “I had my reasons for the way 
that I voted. You know that’s nobody else’s business, and had it 
not been for the card check, nobody would have known if I was for 
or against.”154 
Thus, because the procedure for campaigning for unions provides a 
forum for employees to demonstrate their attitudes toward 
unionization, there may be residual hard feelings, especially in a close 
election.155 While the Albion example involved a union certification 
election, this Comment argues that the same conditions exist in 
amplified form surrounding an authorization election for two 
reasons. First, after a successful authorization election, not only will 
the union represent all workers in matters of wages, but the union 
will also control, in large measure, employee grievance procedures 
and employee discipline. Second, a successful authorization election 
means that all employees will have to pay dues. Therefore, one might 
expect at least as much inter-employee opposition to result from an 
authorization election as from a certification election. 
3. Once the closed shop has become a reality it is unrealistic that 
employee-to-employee opposition will immediately vaporize  
After a closed-shop authorization election—and its attendant 
campaigning and history—it is self-evidently unrealistic to expect the 
residual enmity to dissipate. While unions are required to practice 
 
 153. 383 U.S. 715, 718–19 (1966). For more on violence against scabs and union 
violence in general, see JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS (2006). 
 154. Fox News, (Fox television broadcast Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=LXGRTWnXbK4 (on file with author). 
 155. Close elections do occur. In one study of thirty-three union certification elections, 
six were decided on margins of less than five percent, including one election that was precisely 
a 50–50 split. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 41 tbl.2-2. 
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non-discrimination in the representation of their employees, current 
laws make it difficult to prove overt discrimination on the part of the 
union: 
Closely allied to closed shop bylaws are clauses included in the 
collective agreement which permit the union to object to any 
employee who adversely affects employer and employee relations. 
The union will object to a non-member and the employer in 
compliance with the collective agreement will dismiss him. It 
would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove that dismissal was 
a result of non-membership in the union and, thus, 
discriminatory.156 
Since union bylaws allow a union to voice objection to the hiring of 
anyone “who adversely affects employer and employee relations,”157 
it is not necessarily the case that an unpopular employee would be 
effectively shielded by statute from retaliatory action. 
For the foregoing reasons, there is a higher likelihood of enmity 
between employer and union in a closed-shop setting. 
C. Why Closed Shops Vitiate the Traditional Reasons for Giving Labor 
Arbitration Awards a High Degree of Deference 
Part B’s main assertion is that closed shops are more likely to 
foment opposition among employee and union; this section places 
that assertion in the context of the three main reasons for awarding 
CBA-based arbitration decisions the type of extra deference 
mentioned in Section I: industrial consequences, furthering a mini-
social contract, and achieving increased fairness via arbitration. All 
three of these reasons fail in a closed-shop arrangement. 
1. Granting arbitration awards a high degree of deference is necessary 
to avert large-scale industrial consequences 
First, as manifest in Cole’s158 interpretation of Steelworkers I,159 
the prevailing judicial attitude toward CBA-based arbitration awards 
is that they deserve extra deference in order to prevent industry-
stopping strikes. This is a poorly supported argument because it 
 
 156. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 172. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1473–79 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 159. 363 U.S. 574, 576 (1960). 
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presumably rests on two implicit, unsupported premises. First, 
arbitration (as opposed to litigation in court) prevents labor strikes; 
second, arbitration will not be effective in preventing labor strikes 
unless arbitration awards are given substantial deference. Cole’s later 
invocation of the in-the-trenches labor arbitrator160 may be relevant 
to the first premise; one with inside knowledge of the industry and 
shop norms may be able to pacify opposing parties better than a 
judge, and thereby avert a strike. Aside from the removed reference 
to the specialized labor arbitrator, however, Cole leaves as an exercise 
to the reader the derivation of the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy. 
a. Best-case scenario: arbitrate-or-strike is less accurate in a closed 
shop. This Comment argues that in a best-case scenario, if arbitration 
does prevent unions from striking, then it is less true, axiomatically, 
in situations where there is tension between the employee and the 
union—as is more likely in a closed-shop setting. Assuming that a 
strike occurs when employees are unhappy, and that labor arbitration 
keeps unions happy (or willing to work—a key idea behind Cole’s 
arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy),161 this Comment argues that the 
union would probably not choose to strike to protest poor treatment 
directed at an unpopular employee. For example, in the event that 
such an employee’s grievances were relegated to the judicial system 
for ordinary litigation, a union at odds with the employee would 
have little incentive to strike upon an unfavorable outcome of the 
litigation. Similar factual circumstances surrounded the black 
plaintiffs in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.162 In Lukens, the plaintiffs’ 
union (as well as employer) was found guilty of discriminatory 
practices because it both failed to assert the plaintiffs’ original claims 
of discrimination and because it tacitly encouraged more 
discrimination.163 While Lukens did not involve a reluctantly 
unionized employee (there is no statement that the plaintiffs in 
Lukens would have chosen not to unionize), it incontrovertibly 
demonstrates that unions may prefer (however illegally) not to take a 
stand for the employee. 
Issues of who has standing to bring an arbitration case may limit 
the data available of how many other cases there are like Lukens—in 
 
 160. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480. 
 161.  Id. 
 162. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); see supra note 5. 
 163. Id. 
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the context of closed shops and open shops. In Humphrey v. Moore, 
the Supreme Court ruled that an employee may not challenge a 
perceived unfavorable decision of a union unless the employee can 
demonstrate that the union acted with fraud or breached its duty of 
representation under the CBA.164 The strict hurdles that an employee 
must clear in order to attack an arbitration decision may prevent a 
judicial record of tension and opposition between the union and the 
employee. This Comment makes no statement on the prevalence of 
the kind of overt enmity between union and employee that was 
present in Lukens. It does argue, however, that the possibility of this 
employer-union opposition is exacerbated in a closed-shop 
environment, and that procedural standing issues may prevent such 
conflicts from coming to light, since union bylaws permit a union to 
object to the employment of any worker whose presence “adversely 
affects employer and employee relations.”165 
If it is not true that a union would strike rather than arbitrate the 
claim of an unpopular employee, such an employee might be in 
better hands litigating his claim in court.166 
b. Worst case scenario: arbitrate-or-strike is right for the wrong 
reason. This Comment argues that at worst, the arbitrate-or-strike 
dichotomy in Steelworkers I and Cole is right for the wrong reason. 
Because tension between employer and union is more likely in a 
closed shop, and because labor arbitrators, by Cole’s admission, “can 
account for other considerations affecting shop morale and 
attitude,”167 a union arbitrator may not represent the best interests of 
the individual employee at odds with the union.168 Several cases 
demonstrate that unions may pursue a course of legal action (or 
inaction) that is contrary to the best interests of the employee,169 and 
 
 164. 375 U.S. 335, 349–51 (1964); see also Harvey Bell v. IML Freight, 589 F.2d 502, 
506 (10th Cir. 1979); Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 165. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 172. 
 166. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974). 
 167. Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 168. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19. The Supreme Court has retreated from its 
broader anti-arbitration dicta in Gardner-Denver. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 
1456, 1469 (2009). Because this Comment looks at judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards 
from a normative perspective, Gardner-Denver is significant as a historical example of 
recognizing tension between the union and the worker that the judiciary ought to apply to the 
context of arbitration awards. See supra note 10. 
 169. E.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Humphrey v. Moore, 
375 U.S. 335, 342, 348–51 (1964); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Steele v. 
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this Comment argues that this is more likely because of the increased 
possibility for tension in a closed shop. Moreover, an unpopular 
worker is protected only by the very things that arbitrators are not 
famous for providing, especially under the current standard of high 
deference given labor arbitration awards, namely, strict 
implementation of the employment contract and the pertinent legal 
statutes.170 Because labor arbitrators may preserve the continuity and 
normalcy of the workplace at the expense of unbiased defense of the 
individual worker, the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy may be true in a 
closed shop only because arbitrators can practice triage with the 
company interests. 
c. The second premise. There is another reason why closed-shop 
settings blunt the force of Cole’s first reason that giving arbitration 
awards deference is necessary to prevent an industry-stopping strike. 
Even if arbitration were necessary to stop a strike, it does not follow 
that a higher degree of judicial scrutiny would enervate the incentive 
to arbitrate. Courts, for example, could still give substantial 
deference to labor arbitrators’ findings of fact, while reviewing their 
findings for conformity with the law. Thus, in a closed-shop setting, 
the assertion that giving arbitration awards a high degree of 
deference is necessary to prevent labor strikes is both presumptuous 
and harmful to the unpopular employee. 
2. Giving arbitration awards a high degree of deference honors the 
mini-social contract of labor unions 
Second, Cole and Steelworkers III both promulgate the paradigm 
that the arbitration agreement is a bargained for part of the collective 
bargaining agreement, and therefore the parties have given value to 
receive the arbitration award.171 Cole goes so far as to say that a 
“gross error” on the part of the arbitrator is an oxymoron, insofar as 
the parties have bargained for the arbitrator’s interpretation.172 This 
paradigm is simply contradicted in a closed shop with employees 
who would rather not be represented by the union. Donald R. 
 
Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 323 
U.S. 210 (1944). 
 170. The basic story in the cases in note 169, supra, involve a court stepping in to make 
sure that a union plays fair. 
 171. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1473–79; Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). 
 172. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476. 
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Richberg, Chairman of the National Recovery Administration during 
the Roosevelt administration, noted: 
The entire value of labor organization to the workers lies in this 
power of the workers to control their representatives. The basis of 
that control and the only assurance that it will continue, is found in 
the right and freedom of the individual worker to refuse to support 
an organization or a representative whose judgment or good will 
he does not trust.173 
This Comment submits that failure to represent dissident employees 
is a natural outgrowth of the closed-shop system, in which 
employees are forced to belong to an organization with which they 
would rather not affiliate. 
3. Giving arbitration awards a high degree of deference leads to a more 
satisfactory outcome 
Third, Cole summarized various reasons why CBA arbitration 
may lead to a more satisfactory result than either a judicial judgment 
or even arbitration of a dispute by the individual worker.174 Foremost 
among these was the observation that an arbitrator has specialized 
knowledge of the law of the shop that qualifies him beyond even the 
“ablest judge,” because she can take into account “such factors as 
the effect upon productivity . . . [and] the morale of the shop.”175 It 
is precisely these reasons that make arbitration unfit for a closed-
shop setting: if the arbitrator can indeed take into account factors 
such as productivity and morale of the shop, then the unhappy-to-
join-the-union employee is an easy target for letting go. As noted 
before, union bylaws under closed-shop CBAs may allow “the union 
to object to any employee who adversely affects employer and 
employee relations.”176 As demonstrated above, it is likely that in at 
least some instances, a former scab or employee who otherwise 
opposed union certification and authorization would continue to be 
the object of resentment and enmity by fellow employees. This 
Comment argues that it is self-evident that finding against such a 
person in arbitration may boost the morale of the workplace. 
 
 173. EDWARD A. KELLER, THE CASE FOR RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A DEFENSE OF 
VOLUNTARY UNIONISM 32–33 (1956). 
 174. Cole, 105 F.3d. at 1473–79. 
 175. Id. at 1474 (quoting Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 
 176. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 172. 
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The Cole court also found it noteworthy that CBA arbitration 
awards were preferable because a union actually negotiated for the 
agreement to arbitrate and could return to the bargaining table later 
in a continuing relationship with the employer to iron out any 
difficulties.177 An individual employee, the Cole reasoning continued, 
is presented with an arbitration clause “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis” 
and therefore, in such a contract of adhesion, has no choice but to 
accept the obligation to arbitrate or cease working.178 In a closed-
shop setting, however, those reasons may be reversed: the unpopular 
employee may perceive no choice but to accept the union-negotiated 
arbitration award or not work at all; he cannot revisit the question 
without the union’s sanction.179 If an unpopular and dissatisfied 
employee receives an unfavorable arbitration award, then it is 
unlikely that she will return or even be represented vicariously at a 
future bargaining table with the employer. Therefore, in a closed-
shop setting it is less safe to assume that the agreement to arbitrate 
represents the will of the employee and that the employee will 
participate in a positive, ongoing relationship with the employer. For 
this reason and the above reasons, closed-shop arrangements vitiate 
the reasons for affording arbitral decisions made under a CBA a high 
degree of deference. 
IV. A MODEST SUGGESTION 
Given the foregoing observation that a closed-shop arrangement 
nullifies the reasons for awarding super deference to an arbitration 
award, this Comment proposes a paradigm that is parallel to the 
Supreme Court’s developed view on enforcing arbitration 
agreements. As discussed in Section I above, the Supreme Court has 
come to hold that in order for an arbitration agreement under a 
CBA to be enforceable, it must be “clear and unmistakable.”180 The 
Court has voiced concerns—analogous to some of those mentioned 
in Section II above—that unless the agreement to arbitrate is clear 
 
 177. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477. 
 178. Id. 
 179.  “[T]he vast majority (probably 99% or more) of collective bargaining agreements 
that contain binding arbitration provisions reserve to the union the right to decide whether to 
submit a particular grievance to that forum. Individual employees do not have the right to 
arbitrate their grievances absent the union's imprimatur.” Peter Lareau, Peter Lareau on 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3509, at 14. 
 180. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 (1998). 
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and unmistakable, the individual employee will not have knowingly 
consented to the arbitration.181 As a rough analog of this, closed-
shop arbitration awards could be subjected to a “manifest disregard 
of law” level of scrutiny that includes examining whether the law was 
correctly applied. Because there may be tension between the 
reluctantly-unionized employee and the union, courts should regard 
arbitration decisions made in such a context with a high level of 
scrutiny that includes making sure the law was correctly applied. 
This need not include forcing judicial-like process and results on 
the arbitrator; arbitrators may still render an award that is uniquely 
tailored to the workplace. However, since a reluctantly unionized 
employee has not bargained for an arbitrator’s interpretation of the 
contract or her reading of the statute, federal and state courts should 
determine if the law (both statutory and principles of contract 
construction) was correctly applied by the arbitrator. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Holding closed-shop arbitration decisions to a higher level of 
scrutiny would ultimately conform with the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Steelworkers III that an arbitration agreement is a 
bargained-for element of a CBA.182 If the bargained-for nature of the 
arbitration agreement truly does lead to increased enforceability, then 
when the employee has not bargained for the arbitration agreement, 
the arbitration award should not be treated with such high 
deference. Courts’ continued application of the Cole court’s 
reasoning to closed-shop settings diminishes the persuasive value and 
credibility of those reasons; specifically, it weakens the relationship 
between the bargained-for nature of the arbitration agreement and 
the level of deference that courts give to the arbitration award. 
Therefore, courts should apply a strict “manifest disregard of law” 
standard of review to closed-shop arbitration awards. 
Currently, the arbitration awards made in a CBA enjoy a high 
level of deference from courts,183 while arbitration agreements made 
as part of a CBA receive much less deference from the courts.184 The 
compulsory unionization that goes hand-in-hand with a closed-shop 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). 
 183. See supra Part II.A. 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
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arrangement vitiates and even reverses most of the reasons for 
affording CBAs such a high level of deference.185 Parallel to the same 
way that the Supreme Court has adopted stricter standards and 
greater scrutiny for the enforcement of arbitration agreements under 
a CBA, courts should subject arbitration awards to a high level of 
scrutiny—strict “manifest disregard of the law”—when there is a 
high probability of reluctant unionization. Using such a high level of 
scrutiny to review closed-shop arbitration awards would be the most 
faithful application of the Supreme Court’s inherent rationale in its 
most seminal union decisions. 
Nephi Hardman 
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